Abstract
This paper highlights the decolonised representation of the Kashmir conflict between Indiaand Pakistan, contrary to its colonised version. It includes the historical and geopolitical perspectives of this conflict in relation to the UN resolutions, the UN Commission for Kashmir and its helplessness in Josef Korbel’s view[1], Pakistani and Indian stances on Kashmir and different phases of freedom movements. The chapter argues against Fair’s representation of Pakistan’s “legal and moral stand”[2] regarding the plebiscite in Kashmir by analysing her erroneous claims about UN Resolution 47, 1948 in which she declares that the first three steps of the resolutions were sequential and conditional and Pakistan didn’t fulfil the first step that could then be followed by the second and third sequential steps for resolving the dispute. This section also highlights the differences and connections among fighting for freedom, jihad narrative and state terrorism. Through the analytical findings of this section, we may be able to conclude who (India or Pakistan or Kashmiris themselves as an independent state) has the legal and moral grounds to claim Kashmir in light of the UN resolutions, reports of the UN commission to India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and of other mediators.
Introduction
“The purpose of all representations is to make something unfamiliar, orunfamiliarity itself, familiar”[3]. This has been done with the Kashmir Conflict and its representations in the post-partition period since 1947. Many different representations and misrepresentations have been introduced by people from diverse geopolitical schools of thought — Indian and Pakistani — as well as more neutral commentators with the goal of familiarizing us with a version, they believed, was unfamiliar to the world. Mine is another attempt to make the reader familiar with the decolonised representation of this issue, as yet unresolved because of its colonised representations, I believe, with the intention of making the unfamiliar familiar, albeit from a certain perspective. What is the significance of keeping this conflict alive, rehashing again and again its existence, a conflict maintained by two entities: one is of the mosque and the other is the army camps and of course the State behind the Army that are confronting each other without any intermediary since 1947. The people of Kashmir have been suffering inhumane treatment, torment and misery and are still deprived of justice and peace that they have the right to, just like any other human being. The United Nations needs to help them in their struggle for living free of fear by resolving the issue. Reports of violence by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the US State Department report 2010, international journalists, organized surveys and such need to be consulted and collated in order to resolve the dispute instead of turning a deaf ear by filing reports, which are often then archived and hence can never be helpful for the resolution of any problem.
The Causes of the Conflict
The seeds of conflict were being observed by historians, Abdul Gafoor Noorani, for example and in the historical fiction of Mirza Waheed[4], from1946 onward: a) with the rapid rise in Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s support and activity in Kashmir, also known as RSS, a Hindu right-wing party with extremist Hindutva ideology; b) the arrival of Sikh evacuees joined by armed groups from Patiala, Faridkot and Nabha States fanned the flames of unrest further; c) Mountbatten, the viceroy of India at the time of Partition, advised the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to keep announcement of accession on hold till the Partition, to give Jinnah, the president of All India Muslim League and first Governor General of Pakistan after Partition, a shock, d) meanwhile, communal violence “orchestrated by the state police and Dogra armed forces”[5] fuelled the fire by killing thousands of Muslims[6], forcing tens of thousands to take refuge in west Punjab; e) against this ‘ethnic-cleansing-policy’ the demobilised soldiers of the British Indian Army belonging to the Poonch and Mirpur districts rose in revolt against the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Sikh evacuees, f) joined by the Pashtun invaders who found themselves obliged to help their Kashmiri brothers of Islam against, at least as defined by Pashtuns, state terrorism. Although, this ill-organized invasion turned into “indiscriminate plunder and violence”[7] later, and g) that this ill-organized Pashtun invasion provided the Maharaja an excuse as well as an opportunity to announce Kashmir’s accession to India that was declared ‘fraudulent’ by Pakistan and led Indian armed troops to occupy the valley. Consequently, war erupted (1948) between India and Pakistan.
The Accession to India
The Prime Minister of Kashmir, Pandit Ram Chandra Kak, had alreadyrecommended Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan while the Muslim Conference had been split in two: a pro-Congress National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah and pro-All India Muslim League, Muslim Conference under the leadership of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas. Both of the Kashmiri leaders were under arrest at the time. Advised by Nehru, the Maharaja released Shaikh Abdullah, appointing him as prime minister, to legalise the accession with the support of Kashmiri leadership to avoid any international pressure. However, this instrument of accession was presented to the UN as temporary and contingent, subject to be validated by the will of the people through a plebiscite. Therefore, if Kashmiris would vote against accession to India, then any instrument of accession would have no value and thus ‘become null and void’[8]. The accession of Kashmir to India was denied by Pakistan immediately after the announcement on the same grounds, that the people of Jammu and Kashmir had the right to make the decision of accession and not the Maharaja.
Historical Perspective of Article 370
In 1847, the East India Company decided to sell the state of Jammu and Kashmir to Dogra Ruler Maharaja Gulab Singh through the Amritsar Agreement. The Muslim population was in the majority but they did not have any representative in mainstream politics who could protest unjust policies of Maharaja Hari Singh towards Muslims until the 1930s. Realising the communication gap between the Muslim population and the political administration, Shaikh Abdullah founded the first political party of Jammu and Kashmir, the National Conference. At the time of Partition of the subcontinent in 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh, who being Hindu intended accession to India, decided to remain as an autonomous state to avoid any agitation from the Muslim population who wanted the state’s accession to Pakistan. However, he could neither stop nor control the threefold agitation from Azad Forces comprised of local Kashmiris, the rebellion Muslim soldiers of Maharaja’s Army (who quit army to join the freedom struggle) and the Pashtun tribes. So, he signed Kashmir’s limited accession to India regarding Defence, Foreign Affairs and Transportation to handle the out of control situation in favour of the Azad forces supported by Pashtun tribes. Having limited but documented accession, India landed its troops in Kashmir. Pakistan could not hold back, declaring the accession to India by Maharaja unjust and an action of back stabbing regarding the Muslim population. Thus, the first war between India and Pakistan began. India appealed to the United Nations to intervene, the UN suggested an immediate end to the war, retrieving their troops and conducting a plebiscite through which the people of the valley could decide through a vote either to accede to Pakistan or to India. The war stopped but neither India nor Pakistan could agree upon the terms and conditions of the demilitarization process that could lead to the proper organisation of a plebiscite, and disputes continued.
Meanwhile, Shaikh Abdullah started negotiations with India to add article 370 as part of the Indian constitution, recognizing the special status of the state. Negotiations succeeded and the Indian Government added Article 370, conferring a special status to Jammu and Kashmir as an autonomous state in 1950, followed by the Delhi Agreement of 1952 in which the relationship between the federation and the Union were defined. Jammu and Kashmir had its own Constitution in 1956. India constantly kept reiterating the importance of article 370, encouraging Kashmiri political mainstream leaders never to revoke it.
The Kashmir Freedom Movement heightened after the 1987 rigged elections, but 9/11 changed the whole concept of the struggle of freedom. India started calling it terrorism while the western notion of democracy under its leading superpower, the US, was realigned for the sake of their financial interests, turning a deaf ear to the human rights violations by India in the Kashmir valley. The world’s silence against Indian oppression led the BJP to impose Governor Rule in December 2018 and to revoke article 370 through a presidential order in August 2019, cutting the valley off from the world, blocking all sources of communication, a blockage that continues till the date of this thesis submission.
Geopolitical Significance of Kashmir
Since 1947, the Kashmir conflict has involved Pakistan andIndia in two wars (1948, 1965) along with ‘sporadic’[11] fighting on the Siachen glacier in 1984 to the present and Kargil in 1998 with escalations of nuclear threats to each other. In spite of the fact that the distrust provoked by the Kashmir conflict has marginalized both of the countries in the world of trade relative to each other, neither is ready to move an inch from its stand on Kashmir.
Kashmir as a Composite of Secular India
The Indian stance on the disputed land of Jammu andKashmir is traditional as regards accession to India. India did not accept the well known Two Nation Theory for partition of the subcontinent into two states. Instead, the All Indian National Congress advocated for “the ideals of a ‘secular’ composite Indian nationalism”[12] and for the sake of keeping the economy of the newborn state of Pakistan in control by taking charge of all five rivers which irrigate its land. In theory, Pakistan could later be compelled to merge back into ‘secular composite India’. So, Nehru found it appropriate to bear long-term political unrest; a) for this policy and b) for pleasing the non-Kashmiri public opinion as suggested by Jayaprakash Narayan in his letter to him on May 1, 1956: “From all the information I have, 95 per cent of Kashmir Muslims do not wish to be or remain Indian citizens. I doubt therefore the wisdom of trying to keep people by force where they do not wish to stay. This cannot but have serious long-term political consequences, though immediately it may suit policy and please public opinion”[13]. The biggest democracy of the world overlooked the democratic rights of the people of Kashmir, who were supposed to decide for themselves through plebiscite. For this reason, perhaps, A. G. Noorani declared “Jawaharlal Nehru to be the villain of the piece”[14] for the torment of Kashmiri people due to his being “absolutely dishonest”[15] regarding the promised plebiscite to settle the Kashmir issue.[16]
Kashmir as the ‘K’ of Pakistan
On the other side, Kashmir is/was K; one of its integral units – P represents Punjab, TAN is derived from Balochistan, S stands for Sindh and Shumal Maghrabi Sarhadi Sooba (North Western Frontier Province), now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and K for Kashmir – forPakistan’s existential two-nation theory: first, Muslims were in the majority, and second, Kashmir is the origin of three rivers which irrigate most of the agricultural land of Pakistan, and third, its strategically significant border access to China and Tibet, as well as a short distance to (then Soviet Union) Russia. Moreover, Indian oppression and violation of human rights in the valley is stated as one of the main causes for the support, either active or passive, of the Kashmiri freedom movement[17]. Contrary to the Indian claim of Pakistan’s aggression and military action in Kashmir, historical facts reveal that the acting commander-in-chief of Pakistan, General Douglas Gracey, contacted the Supreme Commander Sir Claude Auchinleck instead of carrying out Quaid e Azam’s order of sending troops into Kashmir. Sir Claude told Quaid that the “British officers would not participate in the fighting if there was a military conflict”[18]. Pakistan was helplessly watching the war between the well-equipped Indian Army and ill-disciplined tribesmen or ill-organized Kashmiri freedom fighters, who did not have sufficient resources as well as trained officers who could command the Pakistani nationals to fight effectively in Kashmir. However, this shortcoming was addressed as a priority by the founding leaders, and that is the reason, perhaps, that the Pakistan Army now stands among the top ten armies of the World.
United Nations to Kashmir Conflict
War in 1948 led India to knock at the door of the UnitedNations seeking a resolution on the issue, alleging Pakistan as an aggressor and the war in Kashmir as an invasion of Indian Territory. In this regard, the UN General Assembly referred the case to the UN Security Council, accepting India’s case and listening to both concerned parties, India and Pakistan, and finally the UNSC passed a Resolution known by the number 47, on April 21, 1948.
UNSC Resolution 47, 1948
The very beginning of the resolution declares UNSC’s observation that:
“Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting,
Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite,”[19]
This clearly indicates the twofold focus of United Nations Security Council for resolving the Kashmir conflict:
- Immediate cessation of all fighting to restore peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir
- A free and impartial plebiscite through the democratic method
To re-establish peace and order, a ceasefire was to be executed at once. Then there were three sequential recommendations to be enacted according to the truce agreement: a) withdrawal of tribesmen as well as Pakistani soldiers or anyone other than Kashmiri people by handing over the charge to “local forces”[20]; b) withdrawal of the Indian forces, leaving a minimum contingent of soldiers necessary for maintaining law and order under the control of the government of Kashmir; c) making arrangements for conducting a plebiscite.
For implementation of the Resolution, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, consisting of five members and chaired by Josef Korbel, came to the Indian subcontinent. This commission succeeded in enacting a cease fire and establishing the line of control to partially restore peace and order in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, but the Commission failed to conduct a plebiscite because of a) its limitations in terms of action as the resolution was passed under Chapter 6 of the UN charter that suggests peaceful settlement of the political disputes through negotiation ; and b) point of no-agreement for both concerned entities, India and Pakistan, on the matter of the evacuation of ‘Azad Forces’[21] while the UN Commission had given assurances to Pakistan that territories evacuated by Pakistani forces would be administered by “local authorities”[22] monitored by the Commission and Indian forces would not be permitted to enter these areas. The proposal of arbitration by the Commission was also rejected by India.
UNSC Resolution 80, 1950
Following the Commission’s proposal of appointing a mediator forreviewing the terms and conditions regarding demilitarization of the forces in Jammu and Kashmir, a UN appointed Canadian delegate, General McNaughton, consulted India and Pakistan informally and came up with a proposal that both Pakistani and Indian forces ought to be reduced to a minimum level, while both the Azad Forces and the State forces should be abandoned in the follow-up prior to plebiscite. India rejected this proposal as well, but in spite of Indian objections, this proposal was adopted in UNSC Resolution 80, passed on March 10, 1950 and Owen Dixon was sent to the Indian Subcontinent as mediator. Observing the circumstances and consulting both India and Pakistan through a five day summit, Dixon came up with an observation that a statewide plebiscite was not necessary because there was a clear indication that the people of Jammu and Ladakh were in favour of accession to India while people of Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas of Gilgit Baltistan were satisfied with being part of Pakistan. So the plebiscite could only be conducted in the Kashmir Valley according to Nehru’s suggestion of partition-cum-plebiscite proposal. This partition-cum-plebiscite proposal suggested the affiliation of Jammu with India without plebiscite because of its population of a Hindu majority who were (and still are) satisfied with its integration to India, while the areas under control of Pakistan could be conceded to Pakistan with its Muslim population. Left were the District Sri Nagar and surrounding villages and small cities where there were Muslims in majority but under control of Indian forces so it was suggested to conduct a plebiscite only in this area, called the Kashmir Valley which was (and still is) the centre of agitation for freedom movements. The Dixon Plan ended in failure.
Main Causes of the Failure of UNSC Efforts for Resolving the Conflict
All the efforts of the United Nations Security Council for the solution of the Kashmir conflict failed. Why? There were many hurdles raised by Pakistan and India to implementing the resolutions, but the most important were the flaws that left some critical points overlooked and thus unaddressed by the UNSC while passing the resolutions. First of all, there was no clear stance taken by the UNSC as the resolutions were passed under chapter 6 of the UN charter that address the political conflict through bilateral negotiation by the two concerned parties. No country, Pakistan or India, was declared wrong — neither was Pakistan charged as an aggressor, nor was Kashmir’s accession to India considered legal. This uncertainty and ambiguity made it complicated for the UNCIP to bring both countries to a certain point of agreement. If Pakistan agreed to demilitarise Kashmir for a plebiscite, India added an essential condition of disbanding local Azad (an Urdu word for free, here it indicates the forces without any official supervision or command) forces. If India proposed a reasonable partition-cum-plebiscite option, Pakistan proposed the idea to Dixon of adding a condition of disbanding of the Abdullah government during the plebiscite process.
Decolonised Representation of Misinterpretations
There have been different presentations aswell as representations of the UN resolutions demonstrated by different, partial or impartial, political schools of thought. Here, it is necessary to decolonise a couple of these representations.
Representation of Christine Fair’s Argument on Pakistan’s Stance on Kashmir
The most recentrepresentation made by Christine Fair, in which she declares that the first three steps of the resolutions were sequential and conditional and that Pakistan didn’t fulfill the first step[23] that could then be followed by the second and third sequential steps for resolving the dispute, hence Pakistan has no legal or moral claims on Kashmir. The focal points which are, intentionally or not, overlooked by Fair, have been mentioned before in chapter 9. To recall the argument briefly, the UN Security Council decided to deal with the issue under Chapter 6 of the UN charter, instead of Chapter 7. The difference is that if the claim of one of the two disputing sides is more legitimate than that of the other, the issues are dealt with under Chapter 7 of the UN charter in which the use of NATO forces is permitted to resolve the issue through interventions or mandatory instructions against the illegitimate claimant while under Chapter 6, the UN do not allow the use of NATO forces, considering equally legitimate the claims of both sides. Since the stance of neither side was perceived as falsified regarding the Kashmir conflict, recommendations of the resolution were based upon directive steps with a certain sequence to resolve the issue — which Fair falsely declared as mandatory. Following the recommendations, a ceasefire and line of control were established but when the UN commission came to the subcontinent in February 1949, to make arrangements for plebiscite by setting terms and conditions acceptable for both sides, the first “jolt” to the UN commission wa Indian refusal to cooperate with a condition to remove the “Azad Forces” from the land of Kashmir. Azad Forces consisted of the demobilised soldiers of the British Indian Army, belonging to the Poonch and Mirpur districts of Kashmir, who rose in revolt against the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir even prior to the tribal invasion. So, it was India — not Pakistan — that refused to follow the UN resolution because tribesmen, Pakistani soldiers or nationals were to be evacuated from Kashmir territory by handing over control to the Kashmiri local forces. Contrary to Fair’s claim that ‘Pakistan has no legal or moral claim on Kashmir’[24], clearly a misrepresentation, neither was Pakistan declared as an aggressor, nor was Kashmir’s accession to India considered legal for the simple reason that the Kashmir resolution was and still is under chapter 6 of the UN charter, meaning, according to the UN, that Kashmir is still considered a disputed area between India and Pakistan and its legal accession to one side or the other (or a third, independent option) is yet to be decided according to the will of Kashmiris through plebiscite.
Freedom Fight/Jihad vs. Jihad Narrative/Terrorism
To understand the Kashmir Conflict, themost important concept is distinguishing a freedom fight from Jihad Narratives of the post 9/11 era. Freedom fighters are those who struggle for liberating oppressed people by revolting against the oppressor while having the moral and social support of the majority of the local, oppressed population as well as recognition of the international community. Jihad means struggle. The struggle against oppression and for liberation is the real concept of Jihad in Islam, along with many other forms, as we have said: Jihad for Awareness, Jihad against deadly instinctive desires, Jihad through communication, Jihad through writing and so on. Contrary to this concept of a fight for freedom or Jihad is terrorism, or the so-called Jihad Narrative that is shaped by terrorist organizations like Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. Kashmiris are fighting for their freedom to be rid of State oppression. They are struggling for their liberty and so cannot be confused with terrorists or their acts with terrorism. “…the mosque and the army camps”[25] are the two entities confronting each other without any intermediary and a majority of the Kashmiris belong to ‘the mosque’ who are struggling for their freedom against the oppression and occupation of Indian army camps. The mosque here indicates the centre of the freedom movements because the movements are being run by the Muslims of Kashmir, some actively violent and the others passively supportive.
‘Real Danger in Kashmir’
The hurdles raised either by Pakistan or India, intentionally orunintentionally, have been playing a recurring role in keeping this issue alive, keeping the Kashmir valley endangered.[26] Both countries are stubborn on some points with zero level of compromise. For instance, India claims Kashmir as an integral part of its territory, claiming to be the biggest democracy but it has failed to address the evident oppression and violation of fundamental human rights against the general norms of democratic practices in the valley of Kashmir. A 2010 report by the US State Department cited extrajudicial killings by Indian forces in areas of conflict such as Kashmir as a major human rights problem in India.[27] Another report said: “Indian authorities use the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) to avoid holding its security forces responsible for the deaths of civilians in Jammu and Kashmir”[28]. The British parliament expressed its sadness and regret over the discovery of over 6,000 unmarked graves in Kashmir. Christof Heyns, special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, has warned India that “all of these draconian laws had no place in a functioning democracy and should be scrapped.”[29] The year 2016-17 witnessed a long period of curfews, killings and pelleting the protesters that caught the world’s attention, that the valley is still struggling for its freedom.[30] Balagopal saw the ‘Jammu and Kashmir question’ as a “litmus test of Indian democracy, not only for the political establishment, but for the democratic public opinion too. To think and speak democratically about Kashmir is, for an Indian, to question all the ingredients of established Indian nationalism, not merely of the saffron variety but the progressive/secular variety, too.’[31]
On the other side, Pakistan claims Kashmir to be its ‘jugular vein’ but is not ready to back out of her demand of a plebiscite knowing that this “jugular vein”[32] may stop the bleeding caused by Indian state terrorism, the bleeding that is cocooning Kashmiris for their freedom fight against Indian colonization, the bleeding that is leading it to death bit by bit. This bloody game of political colonization in the name of accession may end if the Kashmiris would stop fighting for their fundamental right of freedom against the nature of humankind that always go behind the free will. Kashmiri freedom fighters keep fighting with the hope of practical support from Pakistan, while Pakistan plays the political string of its moral and legal stand for the plebiscite. It is the need of the time to look beyond traditional positions and evaluate the contours of a solution grounded in today’s realities.
A humanist, K. Balagopal, sounds very logical when he endorses the distinctivesense of religious identity for the Kashmiris because they have a strong spiritual connection with Islam. So in light of the above-mentioned facts and figures and the study of the results of the surveys, it may categorically be claimed that if both India and Pakistan can guarantee the continuing existence and peaceful development, then most Kashmiris would prefer independent Kashmir. But if both cannot, and most probably they will not, guarantee the existence and peaceful development of an independent Kashmir, the Kashmiris would prefer their accession to Pakistan because of religious affinity and social and economic links.[33]
[1] Korbel, Josef (1966, Originally published in 1954), Danger in Kashmir, Princeton University Press, pg. 155
[2] Fair, Christine, A presentation about her book Fighting To The End: Pak Army’s Way of War, on the forum of The Heritage Foundation https://youtu.be/sjnrETPDuls (1:11)
[3] Moscovici, Serge (2001, first Published in 2000), Social Representations: Explorations In Social Psychology, p. 37, Blackwell publishers Ltd, UK
[4] See Noorani, A. G. (2013), The Kashmir Dispute: 1947-2012, Tulika Publishers, and
Waheed, Mirza (2011), The Collaborator, Penguin Books
[5] Talbot, Ian (2003), Pakistan A Modern History, pg. 116, Paperback version Oxford University Press
[6] Government of Pakistan, Kashmir Before Accession, (Lahore, 1948), p. 34
[7] Talbot, Ian (2003), Pakistan A Modern History, pg. 116, Paperback version Oxford University Press
[8] Lamb, Alastair (1994), ‘The Indian claim to Jammu and Kashmir: Conditional accession, plebiscites and the reference to the United Nations’, Contemporary South Asia, p. 67–72
[9] BBC Urdu (5 Aug 2019), ‘Article 370 Tha Kya aur iss kay Khatmay se Kya Badlay Ga? (What Was Article 370 and What Will Be Changed by Its Removal)’, https://www.bbc.com/urdu/regional-49208728
[10] BBC Urdu (5 Aug 2019), ‘Article 370 Tha Kya aur iss kay Khatmay se Kya Badlay Ga? (What Was Article 370 and What Will Be Changed by Its Removal)’, https://www.bbc.com/urdu/regional-49208728
[11] Talbot, Ian (2003), Pakistan A Modern History, pg. 114, Paperback version Oxford University Press
[12] Talbot, Ian (2003), Pakistan A Modern History, pg. 114, Paperback version Oxford University Press
[13] Prasad, Bimal (Ed.), Selected Works of Jayaprakash Narayan; Vol. 7; Manohar; page 115, the quote cited in A. G. Noorani, The Dixon Plan, Frontline, 12 October 2002
[14] Siddiqi, Muhammad Ali (2014), COVER STORY: The Kashmir Dispute: 1947-2012 by A.G. Noorani, DAWN.com, published on June 15, https://www.dawn.com/news/1112700
[15] Menon, V.P. (1964), In a taped interview to his predecessor as Reforms Commissioner, H.V. Hodson, sited in PLEBISCITE IN KASHMIR: Stillborn or Killed?- Part 1, by A.G. Noorani published on January 7, 2017, inGreater Kashmir
[16] Noorani, Abdul Gafoor Abdul Majeed (2014), The Kashmir Dispute: 1947-2012, Oxford University Press
[17] See a detailed historical fictional representation in Mirza Waheed’s book, The Collaborator
[18] Afzal, M. Rafique (ed.2007), Pakistan: History and Politics, 1947-1971, p. 27, Oxford Pakistan Paperback
[19] UN Resolution 47(1948), Resolution of 21 April 1948, S/726) The Security Council
[20]UNCIP Truce Agreement (13 Aug 1948), Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, (Document No.1100, Para. 75, dated the 9th November, 1948), PeaceKeeping.UN.Org and Mofa.Gov.Pk
[21] Korbel, Josef (1966, Originally published in 1954), Danger in Kashmir, Princeton University Press, pg. 155
[22] Guha, Ramachandra & Macmillan, Pan (2008), India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy, p. 654, Ecco Publishers; Reprint edition
[23] Fair, Christine (2014), A presentation about her book Fighting To The End: Pak Army’s Way of War, on the forum of The Heritage Foundation https://youtu.be/sjnrETPDuls (1:11)
[24] Fair, Christine (2014), A presentation about her book Fighting To The End: Pak Army’s Way of War, on the forum of The Heritage Foundation https://youtu.be/sjnrETPDuls (1:11)
[25] Guha, Ramachandra & Macmillan, Pan (2008), India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy, p. 654, Ecco Publishers; Reprint edition
[26] UN Commission Letter to Pakistan in September 1948 in compliance with 13th August UN Resolution 1948, Part II Clause 3 (A), ‘The India-Pakistan Question’, UN.Org https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/52-55/Chapter%208/52-55_08-2-The%20India-Pakistan%20question.pdf
[27] (Jan 2009 – Jan 2017), ‘2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: India’, U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action, Official site, State.gov, https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/160058.pdf
[28] India uses AFSPA to obscure civilian killings in Kashmir: US Report (15 April 2016),
[29] Scott-Clark, Cathy (9 July 2012). ‘The mass graves of Kashmir’, The Guardian. London
[30] Scott-Clark, Cathy (9 July 2012). ‘The mass graves of Kashmir’, The Guardian. London
[31] ‘Day 85 Toll 92: Hit by pellets on Sep 15, Budgam youth succumbs at SKIMS’ Greater Kashmir. (October 1, 2016), Retrieved 27 January 2017
[32] Balagopal (2007), Will the Pain Never End?, quoted in an article titled ‘Professor Balgopal statement on kashmir issue’ (16 July 2016), The Siasat Daily
[33] Balagopal, K. (1996), ‘Kashmir: Self-Determination, Communalism and Democratic Rights’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 31, no. 44, pp. 2916–2917. www.jstor.org/stable/4404738
(This research paper has also published on International Journal of Advances in Social and Behavioral Sciences.)
